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Rethinking representation: The challenge
of non-humans
MIHNEA TANASESCU
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
This article argues that the standard model of political representation
mischaracterises the structure of representation. After surveying the classical
types of representation and their application to non-humans, the basic nature of
representation is shown to have been unduly centred on interests, responsiveness
and unidirectional protocols. It proposes a different structure by drawing
inspiration from recent scholarship and developments in political philosophy, as
well as the representation of non-human actors. It proposes an ontological
grounding of representation in ‘irreducible multiplicity’, and a structural analysis
based on the concepts of claim and relation. This abstract form of representation
can take into account both human and non-human cases, and works to ground
different typologies. The relational structure of representation creates interests
and preferences, subjects and actors, power dynamics and seemingly immutable
identities.
Keywords: non-human representation; political ecology; political philosophy;
political representation; substantive representation
Representation is primarily – structurally – about relations. These are connected to
the logic of claim-making and rely on the power of linguistic proclamation. Conceiv-
ing of representation as a relational activity of claim-making highlights the multi-
plicity of subjects at the heart of representation, and brings into focus the fact that
when one speaks for another, it is not primarily their interests which ﬁnd political
voice, but rather their political subjectivity. It further underlines the negotiation
involved in representing and being represented, not as a process of honing in on
elusive interests, but rather as one of amending the political subject. Finally, it
shows how this process implies a constant re-evaluation of who ‘we’, the group
with political power and voice, want to be. This is the case for both human and
non-human subjects. An aesthetic element runs through the core of representation
thus understood, and becomes itself a crucial part of its structure. I argue for this
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scheme, by clarifying some elements of the basic structure of political representation.
Structure is here understood as the underlying logic of any representative relation or
claim, regardless of the intentions of the relevant actors or, for that matter, of who
they are (human or not, representative or not).
A theory of political representation has to be able to account for both its human and
non-human variants, and this article shows that thinking representation in terms of
claims and relations is able to accommodate both human and non-human political
subjects. It is openly assumed that the representation of animals and nature has impor-
tant lessons for the representation of humans, because it highlights the structural def-
icits at the heart of speaking for others. The argument therefore moves freely between
human and non-human representation, spelling out the connective tissue that keeps
the concept of representation together across its multiple deployments. It makes
use of Saward’s innovations in representation theory, supplementing them by
arguing that the structure of claim-making has an important ontological component,
here designated by the term (borrowed from Badiou) ‘irreducible multiplicity’.
Grounding claim-making in ontological categories allows us to see that making repre-
sentative claims is not merely speaking for another, but rather creating the political
being of the other. A concept of representation based on the irreducible multiplicity
of subjects is able to extend the claim-making framework and contribute to the devel-
opment of a theory of representation that is neither interest- nor preference-based. As
I show, this understanding of representation ﬁts both its human and non-human
variants.
1. The standard model
Let us start by situating the reﬂections in this article against the background of the
‘standard model’, in order to tease out the elements that I challenge. As Urbinati
and Warren (2008: 389) present it, this model of representation has the following fea-
tures: representation is a principal–agent relation, and it assures some level of respon-
siveness between representative and represented. This model responds in a particular
way to the two most fundamental questions of political representation: what is it
about and who does it (Saward 2008a)? The ﬁrst question asks what representation
is supposed to achieve, and the standard model proposes that representation is sup-
posed to realise the interests and wishes of a constituency. This in turn has been inter-
preted as either a trustee or a delegate model: representatives can either act as trustees
of the interests of the represented, or else be delegated to achieve certain outcomes.
The agent1 is the one said to do the representing. The movement between the agent,
as the active party in the representational process, and the principal, the one providing
the interests and wishes to be represented, is conﬁned to electoral cycles. In other
words, elections appear as the dominant form of authorisation for representatives
to act on behalf of their constituency. Accountability also becomes important as
another source of legitimacy for the representatives that do the work of represen-
tation. Together, the concepts of principal/agent, trustee/delegate and authorisation/
accountability have for a long time been the dominant ones for a theory of represen-
tation. Others have been inserted within these dyads, and their internal relations have
1The word itself implies that representation involves the sequestration of agency: to represent is to pro-
claim the power to speak in the very act of speaking, which involves the afﬁrmation of one’s agency.
Whether this works to serve interests or not remains to be seen.
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been complicated and contested (Mansbridge 2003). It can nonetheless be said that
the standard model offers a particular ﬂavour of representation that is primarily
tied to elections and that conceives of this political process as a translation of inter-
ests, through various avenues, from the represented to the representative. There is, in
other words, a one-on-one relation between constituency interests/preferences and the
representative’s intensions and actions.2
Pitkin noted that, no matter what kind of representation we might consider, it must
involve the ‘making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not
present literally or in fact’ (1967: 8–9). Her deﬁnition has been understood as requir-
ing some sort of previous identity that could be made present, again. Yet increasingly
scholars have questioned this interpretation (Disch 2011). ‘Among academic obser-
vers and political actors there is a widespread sense that we are facing a crisis of rep-
resentation’ (Saward 2008c: 93). The idea that representation can and should be
conceived of as a kind of correlation (or correspondence) between the interests of
one party and the actions of another has been challenged. For instance, this model
cannot sufﬁciently account for how representation can work in international arenas
(Dryzek 2000; Held 1995), or generally in explaining issues that are extraterritorial
(Benhabib 2004; Bohman 2007; Gould 2004). The standard model functioned
under the (not unreasonable) assumption that constituencies are territorially based,
but in today’s world many of the salient issues are no longer deﬁned by their territor-
ial belonging. For instance, environmental issues such as pollution are global
(Dobson 1996). Many different actors who have not been authorised through elec-
tions claim to and do indeed function as representatives. Social movements and
citizen assemblies, non-governmental organisations and social networks, interest
groups and civil-society organisations (Anheier 2004; Saward 2006a; Strolovitch
2006; Warren 2001), have become increasingly important. And the issue of non-
human representation has come to question most parts of the standard model
(Dobson 1996; Eckersley 1999; 2011; Goodin 1996).
This dominant way of understanding the structure of political representation is
not able to account for the kinds of representative activity mentioned above
because of certain fundamental assumptions, clearly visible through the classic
representative types: formal, descriptive, symbolic and substantive. The notions
of formal, descriptive and symbolic representation suggest a bottom-up approach
to interests and identities. The latest developments in non-electoral forms of rep-
resentation (Rehfeld 2006; 2009; Saward 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2008a; 2008b)
have already questioned the salience of these three categories for an understanding
of the nature of representation.3 However, the last classical type – substantive rep-
resentation – is not concerned with specifying directly either institutional forms or
the descriptive and/or symbolic makeup of the representative process, but rather
with what goes on in representing and the normative legitimacy of its claims.
Whether in the ﬁrst three types the dominant assumption is that of the discoverabil-
ity of the other, the substantive type introduces the idea that interests are funda-
mental to the working of representation. Pitkin deﬁned substantive representation
as ‘acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’
2This has led classical theories to advance the concept of congruence as a measurement of the ﬁt between
representatives and represented (Disch 2009).
3Their salience for an empirically based, institutionally minded, view of representation is not under
question.
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(1967: 209). She was careful to stress the complex operations of substantive rep-
resentation, but her deﬁnition left the door open for a one-to-one ﬁt between repre-
sentative and represented, which suggests that interests already exist before the
performative act of the representative. This further implies that substantive rep-
resentation is amenable to a checklist of interests: if interest A exists, then substan-
tive representation happens when the representative accurately takes up A. This is
not exactly a straight line, but the relationship between represented and represen-
tative is nonetheless one based on a kind of mirroring, with interests playing the
pivotal role (Disch 2009; Mansbridge 1999). The supposition that these can be
read-off rests on the assumption that the represented is a uniﬁed subject, a
some-One. This collapses the inherent multiplicity of the represented – whether
they be individuals or groups (see Section 4) – an aspect which I argue is funda-
mental for understanding what goes on in representing.
2. Non-human representation
The standard model and the primacy of the One suggest that representation is of a
referential nature. However, if we think of this scheme in relation to non-human rep-
resentation, it becomes apparent that the issues of interests, correspondence, identity
and so on, become much more problematic. Let us take a quick look at how environ-
mental thinkers have framed the issue of non-human representation, in order to show
both its relevance to human representation, and its importance for an understanding of
representation based around relationality and claim-making.
Trying to show what different thinkers have thought about the representation of
non-humans poses a particular difﬁculty: given the relative novelty of environmental
political theory, the ﬁeld of political representation qua representation is not always
easy to delineate. Environmental political theory, where one would expect to ﬁnd the
theoretical foundations I am after, is dominated by environmental ethics, which has
important connections to representation, but is nonetheless separate from it. There is
an already signiﬁcant tradition of environmental ethics proposing different ways in
which moral considerability can come to bear upon non-humans (Callicott 1985;
1989; Francione 1996; 2000; Garner 1993; 2010; 2011; Haraway 1988; 2008; Plum-
wood 1993; 2000; Regan 2004; Rodman 1977; Rolston III 1989; Singer 1975; Taylor
1986; Weston 1996).
However, there are theorists who have formulated reﬂections on representation that
are more or less separate from their own ethical positions, or that can at least be pre-
sented as somewhat independent of moral consideration. Dobson (1996) famously
conceptualised non-human representation as requiring ‘proxies’. Dobson’s proxies
can be interpreted, in light of the classical forms of representation, as realising
formal representation. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that formal representation
cannot work for non-humans. The proxy representatives, which would stand for re-
election in a proxy constituency (Dobson 1996), must in some ways act on behalf of
non-humans, and hence substantively represent.
The substantive representation of non-humans, following the standard model, has
to ﬁnd some way of postulating non-human interests and preferences. For Dobson,
the interests of the non-human subjects are seen as fairly transparent, at least at
their most basic level. This recalls the assumption of classical representation that
the interests of the represented can be read-off:
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The interest of the species lies in being assured of the conditions to provide for its
survival and its ﬂourishing. The problem of knowledge, then, is one of knowing
what the conditions for fulﬁlling the interests are, rather than what the interest
itself is. (Dobson 1996: 137)
The job of the formal representatives is to ﬁnd ways in which the immediately
obvious interests of their non-human constituency can be fulﬁlled. I want to stress
how interest-language easily moves from the human to the non-human case of rep-
resentation. As I argue throughout what follows, this is problematic, but it is the
non-human case which most clearly shows why, because there the distance between
representative and represented is the greatest. Yet speaking in the name of wilderness
or in the name of oppressed minorities carries the same structural determinants.
Eckersley has proposed the creation of an Environmental Defenders Ofﬁce (2011),
another proposal for formal representation. She points out that some legislatures have
indeed adopted this, for instance, the Committee for the Future in Finland (Eckersley
2011).4 She engages with Saward’s claim-making framework (see Section 3), but
instead speaks of ‘nature advocacy’ (Eckersley 2011: 236). Fundamentally, what is
meant by nature advocacy is very similar to Saward’s claims, while recalling Urbina-
ti’s (1998; 2000) deﬁnition of representation as advocacy.
Nature advocacy has to do with the formulation of representative claims that speak
on behalf of non-humans. Crucially, this process is aimed at persuasion – the point of
the claims is to persuade others of the representative position maintained, while also
leaving open the possibility of changing one’s own claims in light of being convinced
by another claim. Like Dobson, Eckersley maintains a particular connection to the
interests of non-humans and does not go as far as saying that the representative
claims put forth are not about the being of the other. This particular point is surely
present in her work: ‘whenever we represent nature, we, unwittingly or otherwise,
also represent ourselves and the sort of world we wish to inhabit’ (Eckersley 2011:
255). However, the status of this self-relation involved in representing non-humans
is – to my mind – primary: that is, representational claims or nature advocacy are pri-
marily about relations. This is yet to be shown, and I now venture to do that by dis-
cussing some contributions that move away from the assumptions discussed so far.
3. Enlarging the view: summoning, creating and performing
Saward proposes a novel way of looking at the dynamics of representation, as
opposed to its types. ‘Trustees, delegates, politicos, stewards, perspectival represen-
tatives – the shifting taxonomies are often illuminating, but they can distract us
unduly from grasping what are the wellsprings of such roles’ (2006b: 298). The
different forms of representation that we have brieﬂy touched upon too easily
allow a dubious conception of what representation is to slide. Saward goes on to:
argue the beneﬁts of refocusing our work on representation around what I call ‘the
representative claim’ — seeing representation in terms of claims to be
4The idea of a Committee for the Future is designed for the representation of future generations, which is
similar to the representation of non-humans in that it deals with the representation of subjects that cannot
have an immediate presence or voice in the political process. Furthermore, the representation of future
generations implies the representation of their (future) environment (see O’Neill 2001; Stone 2010).
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representative by a variety of political actors, rather than (as is normally the case)
seeing it as an achieved, or potentially achievable, state of affairs as a result of elec-
tion. We need to move away from the idea that representation is ﬁrst and foremost a
given, factual product of elections, rather than a precarious and curious sort of claim
about a dynamic relationship. (Original emphasis. Saward 2006b: 298)
The characterisation of representation as ‘a precarious and curious sort of claim
about a dynamic relationship’ allows us to look at the practice of representation,
and encourages us to think its structure again. The focus on the dynamism of the
relationship offers a way out of the ossiﬁed interests that wait to be discovered and
announced. Here, representations themselves are the primary category in a theory
of representation, and through them we can understand the being of both the rep-
resented and the representative. Representations might just be the midwives of the
subjectivities that dissimulate themselves as prior to their own birth.
Saward argues that ‘There is an indispensable aesthetic moment in political rep-
resentation because the represented is never just given, unambiguous, transparent’
(2006b: 310). He employs the following example: ‘the painter Paul Klee took the
view that painting did not mimic or copy, or even in the ﬁrst instance interpret, its
referent. What it did, ﬁrst and foremost, was “make visible” the referent’ (Saward
2006b: 313). Becoming aware of the aesthetic moment contained in all represen-
tations therefore suggests that the referent is created.
Following Saward’s suggestion that the notion of visibility can have interesting
repercussions for politics as well,5 I turn brieﬂy to Merleau-Ponty. Commenting on
the work of Cezanne, he writes:
art is not imitation, nor is it somethingmanufactured according to thewishes of instinct
or good taste. It is a process of expression. Just as the function ofwords is to name– that
is, to grasp the nature ofwhat appears to us in a confusedway and to place it before us as
a recognisable object – so it is up to the painter, said Gasquet, to ‘objectify,’ ‘project’
and ‘arrest.’ Words do not look like the things they designate; and a picture is not a
trompe-l’oeil. (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 68, emphases in original)
He ends the paragraph with this wonderful sentence: ‘the painter recaptures and con-
verts into visible objects what would, without him, remain walled up in the separate
life of each consciousness: the vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things’.
All this is to say that to think the problem of representation as a tit-for-tat, an (albeit
complex) operation of replication, fundamentally misses the point of representations.
Even material objects are not simply mirrored by their representations, but rather
made to live anew. Think of what fascinates in depictions of still life: painting a pair
of shoes does not simply show us an object as it is, but rather gives a particular exist-
ence – one which becomes worthwhile – to something which did not exist, as worth-
while, before being represented. Without this operation, things would remain ‘walled
up in the separate life of each consciousness’ which, for politics, means that political
subjectivities are made to connect by (and in) the process of representation. Through
and by this process, political subjectivities are fashioned, distinct from and
5Visibility in artistic terms – what it means to make visible – but also in terms of what it means to count:
that is, to make visible in the sense of ‘give existence to’, ‘recognise’ and ‘summon’.
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irreducible to existential personhood. Merleau-Ponty here speaks of painting, but his
insights are certainly applicable to the political territory that occupies us. However,
we must not confuse aesthetic and political representations, even while they reveal
their mutual implications. Aspects of the concept remain sealed into their proper
terrain. As he aptly suggests in Eye and Mind, ‘only the painter is entitled to look
at everything without being obliged to appraise what he sees’ (Merleau-Ponty
1993: 123). The politician does not have this luxury. In contrast to aesthetic represen-
tations, the maker of political representations must already include the appraisal, or
the judgment of the object, into the way in which it is summoned into being. Sum-
moning the image of ‘the immigrant’ or the ‘threatened panda’ is already heavy
with appraisal. Painting a shoe need not be.
There is indeed a sense in which presence and absence are intertwined in the various
terrains of representation. The task of the painter is to make visible certain features that
would otherwise remain ‘walled up’, and the task of the political representative is to
make visible certain beings that would otherwise remain invisible.6 But this activity
does not have to rely on a predeﬁned being of the represented, nor does it have to
suppose the existence of interests that can be plucked from the consciousness or the
mere existence of another. It is tempting to think that, in speaking for ‘the working
class’, there is something pre-existing which is uploaded into the representative claim.
Rather, the activity of making visible – of representing – is the medium through
which the things we call by the names of interests and identities come into being.
Think, instead, of speaking for ‘the river’. There, few would argue that there are prede-
ﬁned interests that the representative picks up. Seen thus, the classical paradigm of
present absence – for humans or non-humans – is insufﬁcient and misleading, because
there is no objective being previous to the representation that could be considered
‘absent’. As Disch (2011: 105) has suggested, classical representation goes astray by
interpreting the etymological roots of representation as a ‘protocol of unidirectionality’.
Absence does not have to refer to physicality, but rather to the non-relevance of a latent
feature, to something that as yet has not been articulated politically. Similarly, presence
need not be taken as physically there, or else as an evidence (i.e., something being evi-
dently so), but rather as the articulation of something newly relevant for politics.
Let us propose a working deﬁnition of the core of representation: to represent is to
summona thing into being in virtue of select aspects deemed useful for further relations
with similarly summoned beings. This creation always implies a selection of certain
aspects, much in the same way that Wittgenstein’s duck–rabbit can be seen now as a
duck, now as a rabbit, but never as both at the same time. Differently stated, represen-
tation is not about representing beings (human, non-human), but rather about repre-
senting relations. In the relational, as opposed to the referential, character of
representation we ﬁnd a statement on the nature of representation that offers the possi-
bility of understanding today’s proliferation of representative situations and claims.
4. Axiomatic multiplicity
Building onto Saward’s work, I offered, via the work of Merleau-Ponty, another
working deﬁnition of political representation, which centres on the activity of
6This is so whether the representative and the represented are numerically identical: that is, even when a
group speaks for itself. The fundamental point is that in speaking for themselves, they make themselves
visible.
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claim-making, as well as on the concept of relation. Now I offer an argument for why
relations, as opposed to simple reference, need to be reckoned in a theory of represen-
tation. In other words, what is meant by a ‘relation’? Whose, and to whom (or what)?
In order to describe its various meanings, its foundations and the way in which it is
fused in the claim-making process of representation, I co-opt elements from the ontol-
ogy of Badiou (2002; 2007). The basic idea is that the ontological unit of analysis –
that which can no longer be divided – is neither a one nor a zero. Rather, it is inﬁnite
and irreducible multiplicity. The bedrock of an ontological analysis (and a theory of
representation is in effect a theory of political ontology)7 cannot therefore be consti-
tuted by a certainty that can be repeated at a higher level, by a solid that can no longer
be divided, but rather the bedrock is itself multiple, in such a way as to form a con-
stellation of multiples that, if divided, will only lead back to itself. ‘Any multiple is
intrinsically multiple of multiples’ (Badiou 2007: 45).
Irreducible multiplicity, therefore, designates that which is both multiple and indivi-
sible, plural and totalising at the same time. The implication is that any postulation of a
one or a zero, that is to say, any claim of stable and given identity or its opposite, noth-
ingness, can only be done on the horizon of a pre-existing multiple. As such, to claim
presence as unproblematic and self-evident and unity of identity as primary is mislead-
ing. ‘To exist as a multiple is always to belong to a multiplicity. To exist is to be an
element of’ (Badiou 2002: 25). If we replace the primacy of the One with the axiom
of irreducible multiplicity, then the operations of political representation, no matter
who is represented, are no longer about translating pre-existing interests into political
actions. Speaking in the name of pensioners, or of endangered species, becomes primar-
ily an operation of selection out of the multiplicity that axiomatically exists.
What is represented then is, of necessity, a multiplicity on which a unity can be pos-
tulated, not the other way round. Whatever is represented, as well as whoever does the
representing, is logically an irreducible multiplicity. The most basic relation of rep-
resentation therefore signiﬁes the summoning into political subjectivity – the creation
of a semblance of unity – which is accomplished by the activity of making claims: the
presentation of a represented and a representative as solid, coherent, uniﬁed, in posses-
sion of identities, interests and preferences.8 In other words, as political subjects. This
primary operation is a linguistic one – political subjects appear as full-blown in the act
of naming themselves, or of being named.9 The represented, though only emerging
from the claim, seems to extend into the indeﬁnite past as always having been the
case, awaiting the representative’s speaking for it.10 The subjects (on either side of rep-
resentation) are fused through the proclamative power of the representative claim.
Second, though political subjects seem to arrive ready-formed, the process of rep-
resentation will soon reveal that to be false, as the indeﬁnite work of contestation and
7As Colin Hay explains
ontology relates to being, to what is, to what exists, to the constituent units of reality; political
ontology, by extension, relates to political being, to what is politically, to what exists politically
and to the units that comprise political reality. (2006: 80, emphases in original)
8The ﬁrst achievement of representation is, therefore, to make visible and to count.
9The logic of this process is nicely captured by the term ‘proclamation’: to proclaim is to announce that
which is inaugurated by the utterance as prior to its utterance.
10This same doubling, which implies the fundamental relation I describe, holds if I politically speak for
myself, in my own name.
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new claim-making will unsettle the initial uniﬁcatory relation and constantly rene-
gotiate it. Therefore, I will have to explain how and why I can speak for the
women of Europe, while some women will question the claim from every conceiva-
ble angle, all the while forming new political subjects and new fault lines. What
remains constant in the ﬂux of representations is the fundamental character of the
process as a linguistic inauguration of subjects. When I claim to represent the ‘inter-
ests of the women of Europe’, I construct a relation between a generic ‘us’ (us who
speak for the women of Europe) and a generic ‘them’ (the supposed women).
Third, there is the relation of the representative to herself, which is not simply that
of the single person to herself, but rather of the group ‘us’ to itself, in other words of
the group which privileges her to be a representative (i.e., which gives her power) to
its own perception of itself. This is to say that representative claims always invoke a
relation of the group with representative power to itself: the relation of ‘us’ to ‘us’.
For instance, when nature’s representatives in Ecuador lobbied the Constitutional
Assembly to introduce legal rights for nature in the new constitution of the state
(Tanasescu 2013), they employed, among many others, a representative claim that
constructed nature as a moral subject. Nature is not a dumb matter, they said, but a
subject worthy of care and respect. She is our mother. In this image of nature as
mother, the group that speaks and that wields the power of the claim signals itself
as morally enlightened. It uniﬁes around the notion of a superior moral outlook
and, in the same breath, distances itself from all who do not think (or perhaps do
not have the luxury to think) nature as a legal and moral subject. Their very voice,
and their speaking as representatives, confers unto them the power of creators:
they have fashioned an image that solidiﬁes their own political subjectivity and sedi-
ments their status as morally enlightened.
So when I suggest that representation is primarily about relations, it is these struc-
tural meanings I have in mind, which are all connected to the logic of claim-making
and rely on the power of linguistic proclamation. This scheme does not exhaust the
ways in which representation is about relations. As Saward (2003) points out, there
are the relations that involve the audience relevant to representative claims: maker to
audience, audience to itself and audience to represented.11 Rather, the scheme offer
the coordinates within which other political (or cultural, social, aesthetic) meanings of
the term can exist. Substituting the primacy of the One for irreducible multiplicity
allows us to describe elements of the structure of representation that make sense of
both its human and non-human forms. Interest-language can still be employed, but
its place has switched from central to the process of representation to, in a sense, epi-
phenomenal. Interests and identities are predicated unto the structure given by claims
and relations.
5. Substantive representation, interests and knowledge
Let us see what the above structure implies for substantive representation. If we see
representation as primarily an activity of claim-making, then we also need to under-
stand the represented as fundamentally unknowable and changeable: that is, as sum-
moned into (political) being in the act of representation. In other words, I can only
11This structural analysis is entirely analytical, that is to say that in practice all of these relations are
involved at once, in the simplest of representative claims.
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claim to know what the represented is as part of my representative claim, and not as if
I merely point out the obvious. Knowledge plays an important role in the represen-
tative activity, but its role is one of support rather than trump card: we can never
gather enough knowledge about an-other, that would also tell us how this being is
to be represented.
For instance, acting on behalf of non-humans supposes some degree of knowledge
of their situation. This is certainly achievable: ‘those who claim to speak on behalf of
those without voice do so by appeal to their having knowledge of the objective inter-
ests of those groups, often combined with special care for them’ (O’Neill 2001: 496).
Yet claiming knowledge of another being does not imply that we therefore know its
‘objective interests’. This is most clearly seen in representing non-humans, for two
reasons: there is a certain intellectual distance that contemplating non-human subjects
of representation affords, and non-human others have historically and culturally
straddled the border between humanity and its other (Bourke 2011; Derrida 2008;
2009). In other words, the concepts we use to speak of non-human representation
betray the mutual implication of animality and humanity.
Consider that, for someone who raises sled dogs, it is in the dog’s interest to be tied
to their doghouse when not actively working at the sled. For someone else, this might
seem preposterous: it is obvious that the interest of the dog is to be free! This other
advocate would cite their own body of knowledge to support their belief, or rather
what they see as their objective reading of objective interests.12 There is no
amount of evidence that could lay to rest the disagreement between reasonable
people claiming different interests for the sled dogs. What knowledge must necess-
arily leave out is the part that representation ﬁlls in, namely the purposeful delineation
of how we want to relate to these beings, in the absence of fundamental and unequi-
vocal and unanimously accepted knowledge that would also interpret itself in the
same way for all. If we understand substantive representation as translation of, and
responsiveness to, objective interests, I think we miss the point of what we actually
do when we make claims in the name of others.
Under this view, a creature’s preference for life (Dobson 1996) is itself a statement
about what kinds of relations we ﬁnd appropriate. This is why we do not talk of the
preference for life of vermin or sunﬂowers, because those are not the kinds of things
to which we assign interests. In other words, to say that a creature has an interest in
being alive, though unproblematic in a colloquial sense, has to be politically inter-
preted not as a statement of fact about that creature (or species) as such, but rather
as a statement about the kinds of creatures that we are tempted to assign interests
to, which signal the kinds of creatures that we are willing to enter into certain relations
with (as well as the kinds of creatures we take ourselves to be).
In Eating Meat and Eating People, Cora Diamond refers to a poem by Walter de la
Mare, entitled Titmouse. The poem presents the life of this tiny creature from different
angles that invite thoughts of fellowship, companionship, shared existence. In Dia-
mond’s reading, de la Mare achieves the image of a fellow creature with something
as potentially removed from us as a titmouse by employing the phrase ‘this tiny son of
life’ (2004: 100). Let us suppose de la Mare is a representative of the titmouse, and
the ‘tiny son of life’ expression part of the representative claim. Then, we would be
12In this vein, some advocates might be opposed to use as such, deeming that to be unjustiﬁable (for
instance, Francione 1995; 1996; 2004).
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tempted to say, the representative of the titmouse claims that the represented has a
life. This much should be unproblematic, which is similar to it being seen as
evident that creatures (whether species or individuals) have an interest in being
alive (Dobson 1996). However, what the representative’s claim is after is not estab-
lishing the biology of the titmouse, but rather imprinting into the audience the idea of
a fellow creature, which is not a biological idea: it is not amenable to factual check-
ing. Diamond writes that ‘it is not a fact that a titmouse has a life; if one speaks that
way, it expresses a particular relation within a broadly speciﬁable range to titmice’.
She goes on to say that ‘it is no more biological than it would be a biological point
should you call another person a “traveler between life and death”’ (2004: 102). What
is at stake in all of these expressions – these claims – is not anything to do with objec-
tivity, or the real interests of non-humans, but rather the kinds of relations that we
want to promote through the use of analogy to human concepts that invite care
(e.g., fellowship). This is the point of interest-language, and not the establishment
of facts about the represented.13
I have argued that substantive representation is not about objective interests, because
political representation itself is not a process of interest-translation, but rather of
subject-formation. The nature of representation discussed in Section 3 showed why
this is so, starting with human representation, and the non-human case argued
further for these concepts being problematic in supposing a precarious symmetry
between interests and actions. Instead, substantive representationmustwork on discur-
sive grounds, as dialogic scrutiny. This has been termed reﬂexivity (Celis 2008; Disch
2011), meaning that the representational arena in which various claims are presented
reﬂects back on itself through dialogue, striving for a modicum of good representation
which, crucially, is always good for now. As Disch (2011: 111) deﬁnes it, reﬂexivity is
‘the measure according to which a representation process can be judged asmore or less
democratic insofar as it does more or less to mobilise both express and implicit objec-
tions from the represented’, which can also hold for non-human representation: other
representative claims in their name must exist.
If speakers present themselves as representatives, have this claim accepted and can
invoke knowledge and care (Eckersley 2011), what we have left in adjudicating
between representative claims is survival in open dialogue. In this sense, the best
way to ensure substantive representation is through a certain design of formal rep-
resentation: that is, by encouraging representative situations that remain structurally
open to contestation and new claims, though there is a sense in which representative
claims themselves can promote or resist dialogic scrutiny, by already establishing
themselves as the only moral alternative. The reﬂexivity of representative claims
means openness to scrutiny that allows the irreducibly multiple to claim its own evol-
ving ﬁgure time and again. This perspective offers a normative alternative to the
dominant congruence paradigm based on interests and preferences, instead
suggesting that the structural deﬁcits at the heart of representation can only be coun-
terbalanced by acknowledging them in the representative arena itself. Dialogic scru-
tiny and reﬂexivity turn the focus back on the persuasive power of the claim, asking
that representations be transparent as to their structure, and hence open to inherent
multiplicity.
13This should not be misunderstood as suggesting that there is no such thing as knowledge about other
creatures.
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6. Back to the structure
The relational structure of representation is able to account for both human and non-
human representation, by inscribing the ontological multiplicity of subjects in the
heart of the process. The idea of dialogic scrutiny – a descriptively based normative
standard – implies that a measure of deliberation is needed in order to deﬁne what
substantive representation can mean, once we have abandoned a view of represen-
tation based on interests and identities. Yet the singularity of the subjects involved
in such deliberations is not supposed by this relational approach. Quite the contrary,
the subjects engaged in representation are conceived of as multiplicities. This implies
that, in making representative claims, the primary operation is that of counting the
subject in a particular way, thus framing the possible interests of the represented
through deciding, in advance, their particular mode of being. Dialogic scrutiny there-
fore refers to the constant competition between different representative claims that try
to count the subject of representation in different ways. Normatively, it is hoped that
this operation can achieve a kind of representation that demands ﬁdelity from most
participants in political life.
Some readers might object that the normative issue has been unfairly ignored, and
snuck in through the back door. What, in other words, is meant by a descriptively
based normative standard? Though a short answer to an important question is
bound to disappoint, I must sketch this view a little further. The issue of the norma-
tivity of representations conceived relationally can be seen either in terms of what the
ethical commitments of representatives are, or else as the inherent normativity of the
process of representation, regardless of particular commitments. From the perspective
advocated here, not much more can be said about the ﬁrst aspect: representatives are
expected to have a variety of ethical positions, which themselves can contribute to the
multiplicity of claims and hence to the health of representative debate. The second
aspect, of the normativity of the structure itself, is what deserves further consider-
ation. But the point is that the normativity of the general structure of representation
can only be spelled out after we clarify the elements that are to count as fundamental
to representation as such. In other words, describing the conceptual makeup of rep-
resentation becomes the basis for understanding its inherent normative valence.
Therefore, if we consider the constellation of concepts advocated here, I would
argue that the normative standard that carries through is that of promoting multiplicity
through dialogue, as one way of allowing the inherent multiplicity of subjects to chal-
lenge the unifying tendency of representative claims. In saying this, it also becomes
my own normative position, for which I then have to argue in non-structural ways, by
invoking further ethical principles. But the point remains that dialogic scrutiny ema-
nates, in this analysis, from a description of the concept of representation in terms of
claims and relations.
To sum up, representation involves: the making of a claim by a (self-appointed or
otherwise) representative, who contends to speak in the name of another because s/he
knows their situation and cares about them This can be accepted or rejected by a
human audience, and will exist alongside other claims. It signals to the audience a
preferred relation to the subject of representation, which constitutes the subject’s,
the speaker’s and the audience’s being as this or that kind. This preferred relation
will justify, encourage or condemn certain behaviours with respect to the represented.
Many similes and metaphors will be used in order to render these relations palpable to
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the audience and to convince them of their rightness. Moral language and categories
will almost certainly be employed to substantiate the speaker’s preferred relations.
The standard model of representation supposed a translation of interests that non-
human representation shows to be problematic. Far from being a special case of rep-
resentation, non-humans allow us to see that the structure of representation as such
needs to be reformulated. Crucially, we need to ﬁnd a general structure of represen-
tation that can work for all cases. I have discussed some contributions that I see as
making steps in that direction, and I have tried to take them further. I have
adopted Saward’s claim-making structure and rejected the idea that we can read inter-
ests from the physical existence of subjects of representation. I have proposed a modi-
ﬁed structure that can take into account more cases of representation. I suggested that
the central idea for the structure of representation is that of relations, which can safe-
guard against the ﬁction of the unity of the represented or the representative. Starting
from the axiom of multiplicity, I have argued that the structural relations of represen-
tation imply both an outer and inner directed gaze: representative relations to the
other imply a relation to ourselves, and throughout what goes on is the creation of
interests and preferences, and not their correspondence.
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